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The Breadtlrof Context 
and the Depth of Myth: 
Completing the Feminist Paradigm 
by Emily Calhoun· 
[Wjhen women start acting like human beings, they are ac-
cused of trying to be men. 
- J. Caucus 
(Doonesbury ) 
Men - aware of their activity and the world in which they 
are situated, acting in function of the objectives which they pro-
pose, having the seat of their decisions located in themselves and 
in their relations with the world and with others, infusing the 
world with their creative presence by means of the transformation 
they effect upon it - unlike animals, not only live but exist. 
- Paulo Frieri' 
In its quest for recognition that women are human beings, entitled to 
the freedom to think and act as human beings, feminist legal analysis has 
largely neglected its mythic dimension. Characteristics conventionally 
assigned to human beings - a unique capacity for reflective and rational 
thought that enables us to interpret and to imagine alternative realities,2 
an ability to construct the world through choice,3 and a need to reconcile 
• @1991, Emily Calhoun, Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I gratefully 
acknowledge the debt lowe to my colleague Marianne Wesson, whose research on 
gender-normed attitudes toward the use of violence gave me the germ of the idea for 
this essay. Thanks also to Pierre Schlag and Glenn George for thoughtful suggestions. 
1. PAULO FRIERI, PEDAGOOY OF TIlE OPPRESSED 88 (1986). 
2. SWART HAMPsHIRE, INNOCENCE AND ExPERIENCE (1989). 
3. See, e.g., MAxINE GREENE, THE DIALECTIC OF FREEDoM (1988). 
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individual and social existence4 - place all human beings, including 
women, in the dimension of myth. However, feminist theory has not fully 
explored the possibilities of using myth in order to argue on behalf of 
women. As a result, feminists have disadvantaged themselves both theo-
retically and practically. This essay reconceptua1izes the current abortion 
controversy within a mythic dimension. In part, my aim is to (re )define 
the terms Qf the abortion debate in order to emphasize that women must 
be treated as responsible and aut()nomous· decision-makeiS~ l1ltiinately, I 
argue that feminists should consider the larger question of constitutional 
theory in light of what myth teaches us about our capacity to deal with 
difficult moral questions. 
In order to understand how feminists might develop a more complete 
legal paradigm, I suggest supplementing the narrative technique of story-
telling used by feminists to contextualize law.s Story-telling, as it appears 
in feminist legal theory, is highly personal. Its impact depends on the 
presentation of reality through detail. In feminist story-telling, context 
mediates the meaning and significance of both ethics and actions. I pro-
pose exploring the possibilities of using the very different narrative tech-
nique of myth in order to deepen and enrich feminist theory. 6 
A. THE STORY -TELLING NARRATIVE OF CONTEXT 
Before I embark on my main argument, a brief review of how femi-
nists have used personal, contextual narrative to expand legal norms is in 
order. This review provides an essential predicate to understanding how a 
narrative of myth can enrich feminist theory. 
Feminist legal scholars have made special efforts to secure recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of women's collective point of view and the em-
bodiment, in law, of contextual norms suited to the reality of women's 
lives. There are various devices for establishing and exploiting context to 
enrich legal analysis,' many of which draw heavily on personal narrative. 
4. Id. at 56 (arguing that freedom for human beings consists of "act[ing] to make 
a space for themselves in the presence of others"). 
5. See generally infra sources cited note 7. 
6. Others have also suggested this approach. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Dou-
bly-Prized World: Myth. Allegory, and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 644 
(1990). See also Marianne Wesson, Mysteries of Violence and Self-Defense: Myths for 
Men, Cautionary Tales for Women, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1992). 
7. The devices include narrative advocacy (see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal 
Storytelling: Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) and sources 
cited therein and Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law 
and Literature Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129 (1988»; empathy (see, e.g., 
Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) and Martha 
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. 
L. REv. 10 (1987»; and mediating dialogue (see, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, The Dis-
courses of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE 1.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1990) 
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Personal narrative, which relies on the details of everyday life and experi-
ence to generate a picture of reality, is well-suited to the task of 
contextualizing law. By illuminating the social, economic, and political 
contexts of women's lives and by juxtaposing those contexts against 
prevailing legal norms, personal narrative helps feminists argue that 
norms should be expanded or changed. Personal narrative legitimates the 
reality of women's liyes. beha,viQI. .1ID<l point of view.,. thtts bringing 
Womerrs experiences witliin the law's purview. The details of personal 
narrative make it possible for feminists to engage in a meaningful exe-
gesis of women's constitutional rights.8 This is especially critical given 
the balancing tests currently used to determine constitutionality.9 Finally, 
as many feminists have argued, moral decision-making is enhanced by 
expanding the context in which the decisions are made. 10 
Feminists who use only personal, contextual narratives occasionally 
appear to view gender-inclusive, contextualized norms as sufficient, in 
and of themselves, for a legal paradigm. Feminists have debated both 
about what norms actually exist for womenll and what norms ideally 
should exist. 12 However, most feminists have not yet begun to consider 
how a legal paradigm should treat women who act at variance with 
(even) gender-inclusive norms. Feminists have asserted the legitimacy of 
women's collective point of view by arguing that each individual woman 
has a right to be heard and to be taken seriously as an individual human 
being.13 Unfortunately, feminist analysis has not fully developed the im-
plications of this assumption. 
The prevailing legal paradigm that feminists seek to change assumes 
and Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and 
Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011 (1989». 
8. See, e.g., Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judi-
cial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 670-97 (1988) (dis-
cussing the importance of legislative facts in determining the validity of parental 
notification statutes affecting minors' abortion rights). 
9. [d. at 664-65. 
10. See, e.g., MAPPING TIlE MORAL DoMAIN (Carol Gilligan, Janie Ward & Jill 
Taylor eds., 1988); WOMEN AND MORAL THEoRY (Eva Feder Kittay & Diane T. 
Meyers eds., 1987); MARy F. BELENKY, BLYTIIE CLINCHY, NANCY R. GoLDBERGER 
& JILL M. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, 
VOICE, AND MIND (1986). 
11. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 6, at 668 (doubting that there is a sufficient 
consensus about women's context to make it a completely satisfying concept). 
12. See generally Colker, supra note 7 (arguing that feminist paradigms need to 
permit aspirational thinking, which norms do not always do) and Cornell, supra note 
6, at 656-58 (expressing concerns that the' feminist paradigm of context will lead to a 
limiting essentialism). 
13. Arguments that assert the legitimacy of women's point of view are joined with 
recognition that social, legal, and political reality has been constructed by point of 
view. As Maxine Greene notes, "the consciousness of authorship has much to do with 
the consciousness of [individual] freedom." GREENE, supra note 3, at 22. 
. J}'. 
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that an individual whose thoughts and acts are not necessarily consistent 
with community norms has a valuable place.14 This paradigm recognizes 
that, on occasion, nonns must be defied if individuals are to act morally 
and appropriately. IS In other words, this paradigm recognizes that con-
fonnity to community nonns is not always the appropriate measure of an 
individual's responsibility to self and others. The prevailing paradigm 
responds to truulifference betw~ indiv~ ~bility tllatis mea-
sured by adherence to coinnuinity' notrils and ihmvillual respolrsiOttity 
measured by personal commitments to others. 16 It assumes that individu-
als are able to make legitimate choices respecting others even if their 
choices threaten or defy existing nonns. Because the prevailing legal 
paradigm embodies this assumption, it is willing to carve out certain 
areas for individual choice in which responsibility will not be evaluated 
solely by confonnity to prevailing norms. 
Feminists who employ personal narrative as their only tool for 
reconceptualizing legal paradigms have given short shrift to these differ-
ent ways of looking at responsibility to others. For all intents and purpos-
es, they have forgotten that women seeking recognition as human beings 
are unlikely to be fully satisfied with or well-served by a legal paradigm 
that consists solely of norms. 
B. THE STORY-TELLING NARRATIVE OF MYTH 
Personal, contextual narratives, while effective in expanding legal 
nonns, are ill-suited to exploring questions about the legitimacy of choic-
es that threaten even gender-inclusive norms. Narratives of myth, on the 
other hand, can help feminists grapple with the difficult questions of 
individual choice and morality. Simply speaking, a narrative of myth is a 
story about a human being engaged in a heroic struggle. The story is 
centered around a human being who is tom by conflicting responsibilities, 
has the capacity to reconcile her responsibilities and the strength to bear 
the costs of this reconciliation. 
The narrative of myth that I encourage feminists to exploit derives its 
14. For some telling illustrations of this feature of the prevailing paradigm, see 
Wesson, supra note 6. Professor Wesson contrasts the way in which juries in criminal 
cases treat violent acts of men and women. The acts of men, like those of the noto-
rious (or celebrated) Bernard Goetz, apparently are evaluated both with reference to 
prevailing norms and also as potentially legitimate even though they are at odds with 
norms. The acts of women, like those of women prosecuted for killing their batterers, 
seem not to be assessed with reference to the second test of legitimacy. 
15. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 1-7 (1975) (discussing the 
literary portrayals of Creon and Captain Vere); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and 
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and 
Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L. REv. 384, 401-26 (1985). 
16. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text 
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force, according to Professor Lee R. EdwllI'<!s~ from encoUllt~rs "between 
spiritual imperatives and institutional prerogatives.,,17 The narrative is 
about the inevitable human struggle that arises when individual morality 
is at odds with social norms.IS The mythic hero(ine) confronts the con-
flict by making choices that put the stability of prescribed societal norms 
at risk. The hero(ine)'s choices isolate the hero(ine) from his or her com-
munity, but they also are the means by which the hero(ine) transfers 
coriVeni:iOnaJ. ideas of conununity and responsibility to others. 
Contextual detail does not predominate in or constitute the driving 
force of the narrative of myth. Context is nonetheless important, since it 
fleshes out the hero(ine)'s story. It also makes the struggles of mythical 
hero(ine)s, and the hero(ine)s themselves, richly evocative for the reader. 
Because of context, the narrative of myth avoids the flatness of some of 
the figures of western allegory or of Greek or Roman mythology.19 He-
ro(ine)s share a common struggle and are assumed to possess the heroic 
awareness and abilities needed to engage in the struggle. They are not 
mere symbolic representations of abstract, moral ideas. 
In the narrative of myth, the heroic struggle is one that most people 
can fit within their particular frame of reference. The heroic struggle has, 
in other words, "a surplus of meaning.,,20 Hero(ine)s evoke empathies 
that transcend differences in the lives of people of different genders, 
races, or classes.21 Very different people can respond similarly to the 
same myth because, in important ways, myth has to do with large 
struggles rather than with specific outcomes, with ways of choosing rather 
than with choices themselves. The heroic struggle is universal, even if the 
choice and the context for the choice are not. For example, Professor 
17. For my description of the heroic struggle and the qualities of the heroes who 
take on the struggle, I rely heavily on LEE. R. EDWARDS, PsYCHE AS HERO: FEMALE 
HEROISM AND FICTIONAL FORM 5 (1984). See especially the introduction to the hero 
included in the description of the myth of Psyche, id. at 3-16. 
18. ld. at 6 (heroes always feel outrage at the threat of convention and its limita-
tions). 
19. A failure to differentiate between allegory and myth tends to compromise an 
otherwise excellent discussion of feminism and myth in DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND 
ACCOMMODATION: EnncAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAw (1991). 
20. Cornell, supra note 6, at 670. 
21. ld. at 697 (myths may be applied to variable, particular circumstances while 
providing a basis for shared experience). Thus, for example, women and men (appar-
ently) respond similarly to the conflicts between society and autonomy embodied in 
classic Western myth. See, e.g., Nina Baym, Melodramas of Beset Manhood: How 
Theories of American Fiction Exclude Women Authors, in THE NEW FEMINIsT CRm-
CISM 72 (Elaine Showalter ed., 1985) [hereinafter NEW FEMINIsT CRmCISM] (women 
students as well as men relate to the myth). The feminist versions of classical myths 
discussed in Alicia Ostriker, The Thieves of Language: Women Poets and Revisionist 
Mythmaking, in NEW FEMINIsT CRmcrSM 314, 317 (Elaine Showalter ed., 1985) tend 
to present similar anti-authoritarian conflicts. 
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Edwards uses the myth of Psyche to show how the hero(ine) of myth fits 
the conventional female, as well as the male, frame of reference. 
Psyche's heroism, like all heroism, involves both doing and 
knowing. The pattern of the tale parallels the growth of con-
sciousness. Each material advance marks an increase in psychic 
range, an apprehension of what was formerly forbidden and inac-
~~ibk._. _. ~ ffifhe_FQismis ciefuled in temls of extemal action 
[ or choice] alone and heroic actions are confmed to displays of 
unusual physical strength, military prowess, or social or political 
power, then physiology or culture that limits women's capacities 
in these areas thereby excludes women from heroic roles. But . . . 
action is important primarily for what it tells us about knowl-
edge ... [and therefore] any action - fighting dragons, seeking 
grails, stealing fleece, reforming love - is potentially heroic. 
Heroism thus read and understood is a human necessity, capable 
of being represented equally by either sex.22 
In other words, the narrative of myth uses contextual detail to illuminate 
fundamental human struggles. 
The heroic struggle that arises from our human need to reconcile 
individual responsibility to others with the demands made by social 
norms is the stuff of myth. Consider two stories that illustrate this strug-
gle. The protagonists, a man and a woman, are both in conflict with 
norms that they have not entirely rejected.23 The first story is the 
western Shane,24 recognizably North American and male. The second is 
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.25 In each story, the protagonist is both 
isolated and strengthened by acts that contravene norms. In each, the 
central character, by virtue of some special ability typically possessed by 
heroes, is effectively unconstrained by norms. 
The heroic stories of both characters tum on how they choose to 
conduct themselves outside norms without denying their connection to 
others who live within those norms. The paradoxes and dilemmas of 
defiance of norms and connection to others are at the heart of these sto-
ries. In particular, connection to others is important. As Professor Ed-
wards argues, heroic power is inseparable from love that is expressed as a 
social impulse. Heroic love, which manifests itself through choices that 
connect the hero(ine) to other human beings, differs from the connection 
that is demanded by conventional notions of community and conformity 
22. Eow ARDS, supra note 17, at 11. 
23. See Baym, supra note 21, at 63. Myths, of course, may have other themes. 
24. JACK SCHAEFER, SHANE (1949) [hereinafter SHANE]. 
25. 'IHE PORTABLE HAwmORNE 337 (Malcolm Cowley ed., 1968) [hereinafter The 
Scarlet Letter]. 
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to norms.26 The dilemmas created by choices that both isolate the he-
ro(ine) from the community - as a result of a departure from norms -
and also establish unconventional connections between the hero and the 
community are the focal point of both Shane and The Scarlet Letter. 
I discuss Shane ftrst because there is general agreement regarding its 
mythic aspects and because most women, as well as men, respond to it as 
myth.. 27 III contras1,The Sc(lTlet Letter is a IIl()I'e ambiguous m)'th.28 
In Shane, -two characters aregtv~n significant powers: Sflane himself 
and the gunman hired by the rancher Fletcher to drive local farmers from 
their lands. Both of these characters are, because of their nature and abili-
ties,29 beyond the practical constraints of society and its normal rules.30 
They are dangerous.31 They both kill, and when they do, the reader is 
left in no doubt that killing is unacceptable given society's norms. 32 
26. 
[A]ll heroism . . . appeals to love, makes love its end . . . . [This 
love is a] social rather than a private impulse . . . [and it replaces 
the] old ideal of community ... [represented by conformity to norms, 
with] a new ideal, ... "communitas." ... Heroic power is insepara-
ble from the love the hero expresses and inspires . . . . [although] the 
connection between love and power. . . [is] often glossed over in 
narratives and interpretations of male heroism. 
EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 13. 
27. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
28. For some, the mythical struggle is isolated in the character of the Reverend 
Dimmesdale. See, e.g., Baym, supra note 21, at 74-75. Others, who perceive the 
mythic dimension to Hester's choices and life, may describe the nature of the struggle 
in different ways. Compare, for example, the treatment of The Scarlet Letter in Eo-
WARDS, supra note 17, at 49-61, with the treatment in this essay. 
29. Shane, for example, is described as intimately linked to "[b]elt and holster and 
gun . . . . These were not things he was wearing or carrying. They were part of 
him, part of the man, of the full sum of the integral force that was Shane." SHANE, 
supra note 24, at 101. 
30. As Shane says himself, "no man need be ashamed of being beat by Shane." Id. 
at 103. And, as Bobby understands, ''there was not the least hint of a boast [in the 
statement]. He was stating a fact, simple and elemental as the power that dwelled in 
him." Id. 
31. Bobby says: 
[Shane, riding to confront the gunfighter,] was tall and terrible there 
in the road, looming up gigantic in the mystic half-light. He was the 
man I saw that first day, a stranger, dark and forbidding, forging his 
lone way out of an unknown past in the utter loneliness of his own 
immovable and instinctive defiance. He was the symbol of all the 
dim, formless imaginings of danger and terror in the untested realm of 
human potentialities beyond my understanding. The impact of the 
menace that marked him was like a physical blow. 
Id. at 105. 
32. Throughout the novel, Shane is portrayed as deeply saddened by the act of 
killing. See, e.g., id. at 110. Leaving town and his connection to the Starrett family 
(and, symbolically, leaving society as well) after he has killed both Fletcher and the 
94 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [VoL 4:1 
The diff~ren~J>etween _~i!ane aJl~lhe gunman lies in the legitimacy 
accorded Shane's acts of killing.33 That legitllnacy-stemsfrom a-number 
of factors. Shane clearly acknowledges his extraordinary power and the 
personal responsibility he must necessarily assume in limiting its use.34 
His breach of societal norms is not random. It represents a conscious 
acknowledgment of the failure of norms in unusual circumstances and a 
. conscious decision to act in defiance of norms. Yet even as Shane's acts 
place him forever outside the conmlUnity, they are an affnmation Of hiS 
connection to others. The gunman's acts of killing are, in contrast, por-
trayed as random, for personal gain, and accomplished without recogni-
tion of their gravity. 
The Scarlet Letter and its heroine Hester Prynne present a similar 
myth. Hester is an adulteress who has given birth to an illegitimate child. 
She is portrayed as a woman outside society,3s living in a realm that is 
alien to other women36 and making decisions pursuant to a set of moral 
standards that are her own.37 Although Hawthorne tells the reader that 
Hester's defiance of norms is serious,38 he also lets the reader know, in 
no uncertain terms, that her defiance is empowering.39 As a result of her 
conduct - and because of her willingness to accept responsibility for 
it40 - Hester obtains a power of mortal significance: the power to save 
gunman, Shane reminds Bobby that "[t]here's no going back from a killing, Bob. 
Right or wrong, the brand sticks and there's no going back." Id. at 113. 
33. Shane is described as "a special brand we sometimes get out here in the grass 
country .... A bad one's poison. A good one's straight grain clear through." Id. at 
8. 
34. Accountability and responsibility are primary themes in Shane. As Shane says, 
"[a] man has to pay his debts." Id. at 17. 
35. Hester is "out of the ordinary relations with humanity," The Scarlet Letter, 
supra note 25 at 344, "as much alone as if she inhabited another sphere," id. at 373, 
in a "circle of seclusion from human society." Id. at 382. 
36. Hester has put herself in a position unsuited for women; her "features should 
have been seen only in the quiet gleam of the fireside, in the happy shadow of a 
home, or beneath a matronly veil, at church." Id. at 353. The scarlet letter has been 
"a passport into regions where other women dared not tread." Id. at 485. 
37. Hester does not "measure her ideas of right and wrong by any standard exter-
nal to herself." Id. at 445. "[T]he world's law was no law for her mind." Id. at 450. 
38. The scarlet letter is a mark "more intolerable . . . than that which branded the 
brow of Cain." Id. at 372. 
39. For example, the portrayal of Hester's strength stands in sharp contrast to the 
depiction of Dimmesdale, the character who represents conformity to society's norms 
and who is seen as weak, a coward, and reliant on Hester to make decisions and to 
save his life. 
40. Hester's consistent refusal to deny the truth of her actions - or to hide the 
scarlet letter - exemplifies her acceptance of personal responsibility. Hester not only 
refuses to hide the evidence of her defiant acts, she asserts an affirmative right to the 
pain as well as the joy associated with free will and choice. Id. at 400-01 (describing 
Hester's assertion of her right to retain custody of her child Pearl, the symbol of her 
defiant acts). 
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the soul of the father of her child, the Reverend Dimmesdale.41 
The Scarlet Letter is the story of Hester's struggle, as a person with 
power over the soul of another, to act appropriately. As in Shane, appro-
priate conduct for Hester requires action rather than passivity42 and is 
associated with responsibility and connection to others.43 As the heroic 
nature of Shane's acts contrast with the acts of the gunman, so Hester's 
choices and acts contrast with those of Roger Chi1lingworth, who chooses 
to use bIS--poWer to· atteffipl -to- destr()y -DimIIlesdabfi soUto . . . . 
The narrative implicit in the conventional story-telling metaphor - a 
narrative of context pursued without reference to or incorporation of a 
supporting narrative of myth - tends to produce an analysis that ignores 
the fundamental struggles portrayed in Shane and The Scarlet Letter. 
Take, for example, Professor Robin West's analysis of Mark Twain's 
Huckleberry Finn and Toni Morrison's Beloved.44 Professor West de-
scribes the story of Huck Finn's heroic struggle to resolve the conflict 
between the demands of his own morality and those imposed by society, 
a struggle necessitated by his relationship with the runaway slave Jim. 
But West, guided by an analytical metaphor that emphasizes context in 
storytelling, is not interested in this struggle. Rather, she is intent on 
showing how Twain's narrative ignores the experience of slaves. She is 
right, of course, about Twain's omissions. West does not seem not to 
appreciate, however, that if Huck's story were changed to take into ac-
count the experience of slaves, it would not be Huck's story anymore. 
His story is, by definition, the story of a conflict between his standards 
and those of a society he does not entirely reject. Were Twain to include 
the slaves' experiences, Huck's conflict and his story would vanish - or 
at least would be radically transformed. 
We need stories like Huck's to help us understand the nature of 
struggle. The story of a white man's struggle with standards set by a 
white racist society, a story told from the white person's standpoint, is 
important even to non-racists, to non-whites, and to women. 
A narrative of myth must be included in the feminist story-telling 
project. It ensures that women will not be consigned to a purely contextu-
al existence. It also insures that an individual who tries to construct a 
41. [d. at 366, 443, 453. Hester also is portrayed as someone who, through her 
actions, acquires a superhuman ability to recognize secrets of others. [d. at 375. 
42. Hester's passivity - preserving Reverend Dimmesdale's secret - is what is 
unacceptable in The Scarlet Letter. 
43. Although she makes decisions according to her own moral standards, Hester 
feels a strong responsibility to Dimmesdale. The Scarlet Letter, supra note 25, at 445, 
456. She also is consistently portrayed as someone who helps the people who have 
condemned her. [d. at 372, 447. 
44. West, supra note 7, at 141. West compares Twain's novel to Beloved by Toni 
Morrison. 
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meaningful reality through choices that may deviate from norms will have 
a significant place in our legal paradigm. Finally, it reminds us that re-
sponsibility to others must be measured not only by community demands 
but also by personal moral standards. 
C. ABORTION, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 
AND THE NAARA11VE OF MY1'H 
The narrative of myth helps us see what is missing from a contextual 
paradigm. But the question remains: Can a narrative of myth provide a 
new and meaningful dimension to a feminist paradigm of law? Although 
I approach the effort to use myth on behalf of women with some trepi-
dation,4S I believe that these familiar stories can be of assistance in con-
ceptualizing a complete feminist paradigm, one that includes not only the 
breadth of context but also the resonance of myth. Myths, properly inter-
preted,46 remind us that for women, as well as for men, evil may arise 
from passivity rather than action47 and that women, as well as men, 
have an ability and a responsibility to reconcile the conflicting demands 
of society and personal morality through individual action.48 
A feminist paradigm ought to be responsive to the possibility that 
45. Some feminists would argue that the searches and struggles portrayed in stories 
of male heroes have no relevance to women. See, e.g., ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON 
LoVER: ON TIlE SEXUALITY OF TERRORISM 59-60 (1989). I obviously do not agree. 
"[H]eroism ... [,] antithetical to social stability, ... [is] appropriately female in a 
world where authority rests with the male." EDWARDS, supra note 17, at 61. 
I do recognize that conventional interpretations of myths present an "inhospitable 
terrain" for women. See, e.g., Ostriker, supra note 21, at 316. Conventional myth is, 
in many ways, alien to women. For example, there are "gender overlays" in myth 
that are difficult to escape. See, e.g., Baym, supra note 21. Women are frequently 
represented as inert, passive objects. See, e.g., Susan Gubar, "The Blank Page" and 
the Issues of Female Creativity, in THE NEW FEMINIsT CRITICISM 292-93 (Elaine 
Showalter ed., 1985). In the North American western, women are identified with ''the 
encroaching, constricting, destroying society." Baym, supra note 21, at 72. Worse, 
classical myth frequently presents women as feared, the archetypal representation of 
evil, the sub-human rather than the super-human being. When a narrative of myth is 
invoked on behalf of women, it may not secure empathy but rather may frighten and 
estrange. Even when myths are constructed for women they may be misinterpreted to 
reinforce prevailing views. Cornell, supra note 6, at 696, cautions that myth can be 
used to transform history into unalterable nature for women, but then so can context. 
See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
46. The phrase "properly interpreted" is critical. See, e.g., Baym, supra note 21, at 
74 (illustrating how powerful portrayals of women who elect celibacy rather than the 
constraints of conventional domesticity are interpreted as "stories of the frustration of 
female nature" rather than as a "woman's version of the [American] myth" of the 
struggle of the individual against society). 
47. Ostriker, supra note 21, at 321. Cf Gubar, supra note 45, at 37. 
48. EDWARDS, supra note 17, argues that women, in their marginality, are espe-
cially appropriate archetypes of the struggle between society and the individual. Id. at 
7-9. 
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acts defying norms - even gender-inclusive norms - may be legitimate. 
All individuals (including women) will occasionally take actions that are 
out of step when measured by prevailing norms.49 All individuals, in-
cluding women, need a legal paradigm that acknowledges the inevitable 
human need to reconcile prevailing norms with personal moral standards 
that embody a heroic conception of responsibilities to others. All individ-
uals - es~j' wo~ ____ ~ua 1e~ pal1l!l.igm_t!u!t ru;know~s 
botIr their awareness or ~ heroic struggle and· tbeircapacity to act re-
sponsibly in reconciling conflicting demands of self and community. 
A feminist paradigm of law should encourage confrontation with the 
dilemmas of individual choice and responsibility encountered by the 
mythical hero(ine). It should assume - and insist that others recognize 
- that individual women have the awareness and capacity to confront 
these dilemmas. Narrative of myth can contribute to the development of 
this paradigm by helping us reconceptualize legal controversies affecting 
women. 
1. SEEING TIIE ABORTION DECISION AS A NARRATIVE OF MYTH 
Were one to reformulate the abortion decision within the mythic 
framework outlined above, one would stress rather than minimize the 
conflict confronted by an individual whose choice respecting abortion 
may contravene norms.so One would acknowledge that a woman con-
fronted with an abortion decision possesses a power that is both signifi-
cant and superhuman, i.e., a power over life that is effectively beyond the 
constraints that society might wish to impose.~l One would stress rather 
than minimize the fact that her power may be exercised for good or 
ill.52 One would acknowledge that, although a woman may take her own 
49. Cornell, supra note 6, at 676. 
50. It is generally agreed that some decisions to abort will contravene nonns. For 
example, there seems to be a strong societal consensus disfavoring abortion either as 
a method of birth control or to select the gender of offspring. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 
H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUI"ES 204-05, 231-32 (1990). It is not as 
well recognized that a decision not to abort may also contravene nonns. See infra 
note 52 and accompanying text 
51. Despite attempts to regulate it throughout history, abortion "is an absolutely 
universal phenomenon." TRIBE, supra note 50, at 52. Tribe's account of the history 
and future of reproductive technologies makes it clear that women will and can have 
abortions despite society's opposition and possible danger to the woman herself. 
52. As Professor Cass R. Sunstein has observed, ''the very existence of the abortion 
right can be seen as a response to a failure of social responsibility." Cass R. 
Sunstein, Rightalk, THE NEW REPUBuc, Sept 2, 1991, at 33, 36. See also, Planned 
Parenthood v. Robert Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2806 (1992). In other words, an abor-
tion decision may be the only responsible individual choice in a socially irresponsible 
world. See also the amicus curiae brief of Agudath Israel of America in William L. 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (making 
a First Amendment argument that the Jewish religion would require abortion as a 
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Ufe in th~ process _Qfs~!!!!n~ an a~rtion,--if <.l~tel1Iline<l ~()a~!4 she 
will abort. The decision is hers. One would emphasize that there are 
conflicting ways of looking at responsibility and connection to others. 
With this reformulation of the abortion controversy, the woman does 
not attempt to persuade others that making an abortion decision is the 
same as making any other medical decision. She does not minimize the 
significance m conseqnences of her act.53 She does not try to persuade 
others that her decision may be made in isolation. This woman does, 
however, demand a constitutional paradigm that recognizes the existence 
of her power and her ability to use it for good or ill. She demands a 
paradigm that permits her to raise questions about the legitimacy of acts 
that may defy societal norms as well as those acts that conform to norms. 
She insists on a paradigm that assumes her heroic awareness of the di-
lemmas of responsibility. She demands a paradigm that helps explain the 
nature of her personal struggle to make difficult decisions. 
It makes sense to reformulate the abortion controversy as a narrative 
of myth.54 However, with the notable exception of the joint opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,55 the Supreme Court's decisions regard-
ing abortion have not yet begun to deal with the woman of myth. The 
Court's decisions on abortion have been decidedly non-mythic in their 
characterization of the woman whose choice is at stake. They have yet to 
positive, moral good in some cases); Brief for Appellees at 68-81, Patricia R. Harris 
v. Cora McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268). 
53. Although the Supreme Court's refusal to grant the fetus constitutional status 
may for some women ameliorate the significance of the choice entailed in an abortion 
decision, for most women the mere existence of potential life makes the decision 
significant. See, e.g., the stories told in amicus curiae brief filed by Women Who 
Have Had Abortions, William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 
490 (1989) (No. 88-605); Colker, supra note 7, at 1046, 1063-66; Kimberly Sharron 
Dunn, The Prize and the Price of Individual Agency: Another Perspective on Abortion 
and Liberal Government, 1990 DUKE L. J. 81, 101-03, 108; Carol Gilligan, Feminist 
Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 11, 36-
39 (1985). I doubt that the Court will declare the fetus to be a person, as the discus-
sion of the status of the fetus is one of the most unequivocal parts of Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). Even the strongest critics of Roe apparently have not pushed 
for a contrary decision. See, e.g., the argument of Charles Fried in Webster, Women's 
Liberty by a Thread, N.Y. nMES, Apr. 28, 1989, at A38. Recognition of the fetus as 
a constitutional person would have obvious and significant effects beyond the abortion 
context. See, e.g., William Saleton, If Fetuses are People . .. reductio ad absurdum 
in Missouri,' Abortion Legislation, THE NEW REPUBuc, Sept. 18, 1989, at 18. The 
Court's ultimate resolution of this issue does not affect the basic argument of this 
essay. 
54. Many people emphasize features of the abortion decision that coincide with fea-
tures of the heroic struggles described in this essay. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 50, 
at 137-38, 211; Colker, supra note 7, at 1046, 1063-66; and Dunn, supra note 53, at 
101-103, 108. 
55. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803-08 (1992). 
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place the conflicts and dilemmas inherent in this choice in a mythic di-
mension. In other words, they have neither acknowledged the heroic 
struggle implicit in an abortion decision nor assumed a woman's heroic 
awareness and capacity to make such a choice. 
The deficiencies in the abortion decisions have resulted from the 
Supreme Court's (mis)use of context. The predominantly medical context 
of the Court's analysis detracts from an analysis that has. a !DJ1ltic ~ 
sion~· Aeooroing-1ORVe-v.-:- Wclde~~abOrtIon deCiSion IS a medical 
decision that must be supported by sound medical judgment.57 In Roe, 
rights and interests are discussed in a medical context. 58 Some portions 
of Roe seem to protect only the right of the physician to exercise inde-
pendent medical judgment.59 Others refer to the importance of protecting 
consultation of the woman with her physician.60 In both positions, the 
locus of responsible decision-making is the physician rather than the 
woman. The opinion of the Court implicitly assumes that women will de-
cide to have an abortion without regard to moral, medical, or social con-
sequences. In contrast, the Court explicitly presumes that a licensed phy-
sician will act competently and in accordance with professional responsi-
bilities in considering abortion as a medical option. The Court offers this 
presumption to reassure us that abortion will not be available to women 
on demand and that women will not be allowed otherwise to abuse the 
right to abortion. 61 In Roe, the states are informed that they can guard 
against abuses of abortion rights by levying traditional professional sanc-
tions against physicians who act inappropriately.62 The medical context 
firmly ensconced in Roe is a predominant feature of subsequent abortion 
decisions.63 Although the importance of the medical context of abortion 
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
57. Id. at 166. As Justice Douglas stated in a brief explanatory statement accompa-
nying a denial of certiorari in Cheaney AKA Owens v. Indiana, 410 U.S. 991 (1973), 
Roe is "confined to the condition . . . that the abortion, if performed, be based on 
an appropriately safeguarded medical judgment" Id. The denial of certiorari in 
Cheaney affirmed the conviction of a non-physician who had performed an abortion, 
but Douglas' reasoning seems to apply to all abortion controversies. 
58. See TRIBE, supra note 50, at 30-51 (regarding the primary role assumed by the 
medical profession in the abortion debate). 
59. 410 U.S. at 164. 
60. Id. at 153. 
61. Id. at 165-66; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 199-200 (1973). 
62. 410 U.S. at 165-66. 
63. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. John C. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (prohibiting states from interfering with a doctor's assessment 
of the safety of a particular medical procedure for abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 388-94 (1979) (recognizing a need to protect the independence of a 
physician's medical judgment regarding fetal viability); Richard Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 759-65 (1986); and Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983) (demonstrating a reluctance 
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is somewhat diminished in the Court's most recent abortion decisions, it 
is still an essential feature.64 
The Court has also denied the mythic stature of women in its abor-
tion decisions by (mis)using the context of pregnancy. For example, in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecoiogists,65 
Justice White argues that a mother must not be considered in isolation 
fmnl- tlw fe1;us;- therefore, a woman'~constitutional~hh Wl1a.~ver_!hat 
right may be, is climlnlshe<f with pregnancy: To fustice White, pregnancy 
(or the fetus) is not simply a factor to be balanced against a woman's 
right. Rather, pregnancy transforms a woman into a diminished constitu-
tional individual, a "pregnantwoman" who serves as a vehicle for the 
state's interests. By virtue of pregnancy, otherwise basic rights are per se 
diminished. Justice White accomplishes this transformation by extracting 
language from Roe's discussion of the nature of the state's interest in p0-
tential life66 and incorporating it into a discussion of the nature of a 
woman's right.67 
A narrative of myth would militate against an analysis of the medical 
context of abortion that substitutes the decisional rights of physicians for 
those of women. It would also tend to preclude an analysis that (mis)uses 
the context of pregnancy to construct an essentialist "pregnantwoman" 
with lesser constitutional rights. 
2. THE NARRATIVE OF MYTH IN THE CONSTITUTION 
It is quite possible for constitutional dialogue to take place in a di-
mension that conveys the mythic status of the individual woman as deci-
sion-maker. To engage in this dialogue, one need only recognize that the 
Constitution itself assumes that conflicts between community norms and 
individual notions of responsibility will exist and that conflicts should not 
be resolved by majority determination but instead should be left to the 
individual's conscience. Moreover, the Constitution implicitly assumes 
that individuals have the awareness and capacity to resolve these kinds of 
conflicts. The Constitution acknowledges the inevitability of the human 
to impose a rigid structure on physician-patient dialogue). 
64. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Robert Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992) 
(the joint opinion states that statutory informed consent requirements are related to the 
state objective of protecting maternal psychological health); Irving Rust v. Louis W. 
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1777 (1991) (in discussing the rUth Amendment rights of 
women, the majority observes that a physician's medical judgment as to what is re-
quired, as well as information sought by the patient, is important to the physician-
patient dialogue). See also infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
65. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
66. 410 U.S. at 159. 
67. Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 792 
(1986). See TRIBE, supra note 50, at 96-98. 
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struggle that is addressed in myth and posits the existence of a constitu-
tionally archetypal individual who possesses the awareness and capacities 
of the mythic hero(ine). Thus, one must ensure that the discussion of 
women's decisional rights is informed both by an understanding of the 
heroic struggle and by the presumed individual capacities of the constitu-
tional archetype. 
The constitutional archetype, like the b.ero(ine) of myth~ _a~ to 
establish connection to otherS by reconcifmg nortns with autonomous 
choices that deviate from accepted norms.68 The surplus of meaning 
with which the constitutional archetype is imbued provides ample grist 
for the mill of constitutional debate. For example, there may be strong 
disagreement as to whether specific rights flow inexorably from the con-
stitutional archetype.69 But the archetype itself, the individual struggling 
to reconcile conflicting demands, is recognizable and acceptable to very 
different people.70 
The constitutional archetype is a creature of our general understand-
ing of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of 
Rights. Together, these documents embody the very tensions at the heart 
of the myths presented in Shane and The Scarlet Letter.7I Consider Gary 
Wills' explication of the constitutional archetype in Inventing America: 
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence.72 Wills is primarily concerned 
with Jefferson's view as reflected in the Declaration of Independence. 
According to Wills, Jefferson was influenced by the widespread belief 
that the highest faculty possessed by the individual was the moral sense. 
The moral sense was communally oriented. It was the basis of individual 
accountability, as well as the bond between individuals, and was believed 
to guide individuals to act benevolently toward others. All people were 
thought to possess this faculty equally. 
The existence of the moral sense was critical to the recognition of 
certain individual rights. For example, the right to pursue happiness was 
considered inalienable because it was believed to be necessary to the full 
expression of the moral sense. Thus, individual rights were conceived not 
68. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text 
69. Compare the discussion and argument in Jeffrey Koehlinger, Substantive Due 
Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking the Modem Privacy 
Cases, 65 IND. L.I. 723 (1990) (concluding that there is not a right to abortion that 
withstands contrary state interests) with Dunn, supra note 53 (concluding that a right 
to abortion should be recognized). 
70. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
71. Suzanne Sherry, Civic Vinue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) presents an excellent discussion of the ambivalent 
themes and philosophical views respecting individual and community that inform each 
of the political documents. 
72. See generally GARY WILLS, INvENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 167-255 (1979). 
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only as protections against government intrusions but also as an affirma-
tion of an important individual stature. These rights placed the individual 
in a mythic dimension of individual choice and action respecting matters 
of significance, including those matters related to communal obligations. 
We need not accept the Jeffersonian ideas discussed by Wills as 
correct in their particulars in order to recognize the constitutional arche-
t}'pe-_We.Bee ~arc~. the- ~ttempl !C> .. reconcile differenlnotions of 
responsibility and connection to others, in other accounts of ow constitu-
tional history. At the level of archetype, Wills' pursuer of happiness is 
not unlike the individual who possesses a "rational liberty" interest. 73 
Wills' archetype is not unlike the individual whose dedication to "civic 
virtue" comes close to Jefferson's classical republicanism.74 Wills' ar-
chetype is not unlike the individuals whose presumed equal possession of 
"faculties suited to individual agency in ordering individual lives" makes 
governmental coercion of some acts inappropriate.7S What unites these 
individuals as archetype is not their a priori devotion to a particular view 
of responsibility to others. There is no unity in this regard. Rather, they 
are united as archetype in their heroic struggle to reconcile those different 
views of responsibility. They are united as archetype in the assumption 
that they have the heroic awareness and capacity to engage in that strug-
gle. Constitutional history and doctrine may be ambivalent as to the a 
priori question of responsibility,76 but there is no uncertainty about the 
struggle. As in myth, the Constitution permits us continually to revisit the 
struggle. 77 
Until the authors of the joint opinion spoke in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, one might have searched the abortion decisions in vain either for 
the constitutional archetype, for an affirmation of women as constitution-
ally heroic individuals, or for a discussion that places a woman and her 
choice in a mythic dimension. Although some Justices seemed both to 
recognize the significance of a woman's decisional righeS and to ac-
knowledge the non-medical character of the abortion decision,79 they 
73. Koeblinger, supra note 69. 
74. Sherry, supra note 71. 
75. Dunn, supra note 53, at 88-93. 
76. Sherry, supra note 71, at 550-62. 
77. ld. at 577. 
78. See, e.g., William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 
537 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Irving Rust v. Louis L. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 
1759, 1784-86 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
79. There is, however, considerable ambiguity in this regard. For example, the 
dissenters in Rust declare that "Roe . . . and its progeny are not so much about a 
medical procedure as they are about a woman's fundamental right to self-determina-
tion." ld. at 1784. They also refer to the importance of a woman's right to "bodily 
self-determination." ld. at 1785. Yet they couch their analysis as a discussion of 
"medical option[s]," "medical situation[s]," and "health-related decisions," and they 
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were in a decided minority. Moreover, their language was not linked to a 
strong philosophical position regarding the status of woman as archetype. 
There was no apparent recognition that a mythic conception of individual 
awareness and capacity is necessary to an adequate discussion of indi-
vidual rights. In general, participants in the abortion debate either gave 
short shriftso or were resistant t081 a mythic conception of the individu-
al woman. 
. It is- profoundly troubling that the abortion decisions and debate have 
not generally been imbued with a mythic dimension that is relevant to 
acts of moral significance taken by individuals. We use this dimension in 
analyzing other, similarly complex, moral decisions. For example, there is 
continue to speak of the special role of the physician. Id. at 1785-86. 
80. Advocates' briefs typically discuss only the right, not the archetypal individual 
of choice, and characterize the right in ways that minimize the archetypal dimension. 
For example, pro-choice advocates continue to stress the right to medical self-determi-
nation. See, e.g., the petitioners' brief and the amicus curiae brief of the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in Irving Rust v. Louis W. Sullivan, III 
S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (No. 89-1391). The latter brief stressed that women should not be 
given misleading information, a potentially archetypal issue, but restricted argument to 
the assertion that misleading information increases the medical risks inherent in preg-
nancy. Id. at 28. Of the many briefs filed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servic-
es, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), the brief that most directly argues that women 
are involved in making a moral decision was filed on behalf of Women Who Have 
Had an Abortion. 
Even persons generally supportive of a woman's right to make an abortion deci-
sion occasionally make statements that undercut recognition of an archetypal stature 
for women. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Future of Abortion, THE N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, Sept. 28, 1989, at 47, 49 (the state's interest in ensuring that women under-
stand the "moral gravity" of their decision may justify state regulation). 
The majority in Rust certainly gives short shrift to a mythic conception of deci-
sion-making for women. For example, it refuses to take into account the way in 
which Title X regulations use information to manipulate the choices of indigent wom-
en. It also gives little if any weight to the reality of the lives of indigent women 
who, without some affirmative steps on the part of government, may not be in a 
position in which it is even meaningful to speak of constitutional rights in an arche-
typal dimension. 
81. See, e.g., the brief of amici curiae Covenant House and Good Counsel, Inc., in 
William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-
605). Amici represent that they are worried that a right to abortion will encourage 
"provisional parenthood" by both men and women; however, their descriptions of men 
and women differ radically. Women are portrayed as uninitiated in "the delicate 
medicalllegal debate over the nuances of 'trimesters'" and likely to regard as "[fanci-
ful] . . . any responsibility for personal sacrifice or even prudent medical attention" 
in making an abortion decision. Id. at 24. "For fathers, by contrast, abortion on de-
mand presents an often excruciating dilemma. Some are eager to become parents and 
suffer a deep sense of loss after an abortion." Id. In this brief, only men are charac-
terized as reflective and responsible decision-makers, personally confronting a dilemma 
of significance that involves connection to others. Cf Justice Scalia's well-known 
characterization of Justice O'Connor's views on abortion as irrational. Webster, 492 
U.S. at 536, n. * (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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a long and strong tradition that restricts governments from requiring one 
person to save another's life by sacrificing his or her own.82 In this tra-
dition, the state's deference to individual choice affirms the individual's 
heroic stature. It gives individuals the freedom to reconcile conflicting 
obligations to others. There is every reason to believe that women as a 
group (although not every woman) can and will resolve morally complex 
dilemmas at .~n~nwell_~llleIl ~ a .8!"oup (althou~_not n~~ly as 
well as every man), ana that women can and will give at least-~mueh 
weight to their responsibilities to others in making decisions.83 There is 
no reason to believe that women are more likely than men to abuse their 
powers to decide matters of significance. 
Perhaps the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey84 portends a change in the way 
women's constitutional rights are conceived because, in some respects, it 
moves constitutional debate into the dimension of myth. For example, in 
explaining why the abortion decision warrants protection as a liberty 
interest, the joint opinion speaks of the importance of "intimate and per-
sonal . ., choices central to personal dignity and autonomy. ,,8S The 
opinion puts the "right to defme one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" at ''the heart 
of liberty.,,86 This is because "[b]eliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compul-
sion of the State.,,87 Choices respecting pregnancy and abortion concern 
not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility 
and respect for it .... [R]easonable people will have differences 
of opinion about ... [it]. One view is based on such reverence 
for the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be wel-
comed and carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be 
to provide for the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that 
82. For example, a state does not force individuals to donate portions of their body 
(before or after death) to save other persons, even relatives. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTl11JTlONAL LAW 1354-62 (1988). According to Tribe, the tradition 
would presumably not permit a state to interfere with a father's refusal to donate life-
saving blood to save the life of a voluntarily conceived fetus. See also TRIBE, supra 
note 50, at 130-35; Dunn, supra note 53, at 109-14. Cj. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: 
Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate 
Ignores), 105 HARv. L. REv. 80, 85-86 n.12-13 and 95-96 n.43 (1991) (arguing that 
the discrepancy in how we treat abortion and other similar decisions makes anti-abor-
tion laws suspect). 
83. See, e.g., MAPPING THE MORAL DoMAIN, supra note 10; GREENE, supra note 3; 
WOMEN AND MORAL THEoRY, supra note 10. 
84. 112 S. Cl 2791, 2803-33 (1992). 
85. Id. at 2807. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a 
cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent. These are inti-
mate views with infinite variations. 88 
105 
The joint opinion places the abortion decision "within the zone of 
conscience and belief."89 It links beliefs about abortion and the abortion 
decision itself to "personhood,t90 and "human responsibility,,91 rather 
thanro me(jjc~ treatment 92 . Altboughit recogt$es that· the abortion de-
cision is not made in isolation, it does not consider the woman facing the 
decision to be a lesser constitutional individual, a "pregnantwoman" 
whose rights are per se diminished by virtue of pregnancy.93 It under-
stands that the struggle to make significant decisions is a defining experi-
ence of human beings and that to be deprived of that right through state 
compulsion is, on occasion, to be denied humanity. 
For the first time in a written opinion discussing the rights of women, 
some members of the Supreme Court have recognized that the discussion 
calls for a mythic perspective. In these respects, the opinion is promising. 
But the opinion is also flawed. While the abortion decision is clearly 
placed in a mythic dimension, the decision-maker herself is not. 
Thus, in applying its undue burden test to statutory informed consent 
requirements, the joint opinion effectively permits states to assume that 
women need special help - a "reasonable framework for,,94 - deciding 
whether to carry a pregnancy to term. States "may enact rules and regula-
tions designed to encourage... [women] to know that there are 
philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to 
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term."9S States may 
adopt "[m]easures aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates 
the consequences for the fetus."96 
The joint opinion ignores the fact that states like Pennsylvania assume 
that special assistance in matters of adult, personal conscience is needed 
only for women. In justifying their conclusion that the informed consent 
requirement is constitutional, the Justices argue that a law mandating that 
recipients of kidney transplants be given information about risks to kid-
88. [d. at 2807-08. 
89. [d. at 2807. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
92. The opinion does not entirely avoid the medical context, however. See id. at 
2823. 
93. See, e.g., id. at 2817 (the critical issue in Roe was the ''weight to be given the 
state interest, not the strength of the woman's interest"). 
94. [d. at 2818. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
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ney donors would be constitutiQnal.97 Of course, states. have not adopted 
such laws. The crucial point for women seeking full constitUtional equali-
ty is that society does not question whether men, generally, can make 
mature and informed decisions.98 It only questions that capacity in wom-
en confronting an unwanted pregnancy.99 Men are assumed to have the 
heroic qualities needed to function responsibly within constitutionally de-
fined arenas of liberty. Women's heroic qnalities have yet to be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Feminist analysis needs to insist on a paradigm for constitutional 
analysis that includes the dimension of myth. Conflicts between different 
views of responsibility and connection to others - conflicts inherent in 
communal existence - are unlikely to vanish even if norms are ex-
panded to include women's experiences. Hester Prynne's narrative of 
myth attests to this fact. Although Hester hoped for a social transforma-
tionl()() and a new truth 101 that would make life easier for women, she 
also recognized that such a transformation would require change of a 
religious magnitudelO2 and a complete rejection of pre-existing 
norms. to3 Under those circumstances, Hester's life necessarily com-
prised a story of a continuing personal struggle to resolve conflicts re-
specting social norms that she did not entirely reject.104 Because a nar-
rative of myth helps generate a paradigm that addresses this conflict, it is 
essential to women. 
Feminists use context to persuade lawmakers to listen and respond to 
the reality of women's lives. An analysis of context explicitly and openly 
relies on appeals to others - e.g., to men or to judges - to pay more 
attention to women's context. A narrative of myth is also used to per-
suade. But a narrative of myth secures an empathy for women that is 
stronger and more powerful than an empathy invoked merely by context. 
97. Id. at 2823. 
98. See Calabresi, supra note 83. 
99. However, it is worth noting that, in concluding that women will not be unduly 
burdened by state imposition of a decision-making framework that explores only one 
side of the issue of conscience, the joint opinion arguably assigns superhuman deci-
sion-making capacities to women. 
100. The Scarlet Letter, supra note 25, at 452. 
101. /d. at 545. 
102. Id. at 545-46. 
103. Id. at 452. 
104. At the conclusion of The Scarlet Letter, Hester returns to live her life at the 
outskirts of the town that has condemned her. Because of the conclusion, EDWARDS, 
supra note 17, views Hester as a failed heroine. Id. at 56. Edwards does not ade-
quately reconcile her view with her recognition either that women require a context in 
order to be heroic, id. at 6, 7, or that all heroes "rest[] and rust[]" after their quest 
is over. Id. at 7. 
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Myth secures an empathy that flows from its presentation of a story of a 
struggle that almost all people can recognize. In contrast, context must 
rely on the willingness of others to pay attention to different, sometimes 
alien, stories. lOS At the level of myth, empathy arises as a natural and 
positive affirmation of connection, rather than as a gift given by insiders 
in response to pleas for understanding by outsiders. 
Myth does not necessarily displace context. Instead, it makes context 
usefutratlrer than potentiatlyliriritffig: onceempathY ls-secured,the-most 
forceful presentation of women's context may be offered without fear that 
contextual differences will pervert conventional analysis.l06 I find it dif-
ficult, for example, to imagine that a Justice who accepts the constitution-
al archetype for women would misuse women's context in the way it has 
been misused by Justice White in the abortion decisions. I07 A Justice 
who accepts the constitutional archetype for women will use context to 
assess the legitimacy of specific state acts that affect women and to deter-
mine their constitutionality in a specific contextual setting. A Justice who 
accepts the constitutional archetype for women will not use context to 
emphasize the "otherness" of women so as to exclude them from the 
realm of conventional legal discourse. In other words, myth helps ensure 
that context will be used to solve problems of constitutional dimension 
for women, rather than as an identifier of illusory differences that con-
found a meaningful discussion of constitutional rights. 
Only by securely positioning themselves in a mythic constitutional 
dimension will women ensure that an analysis of context will not be 
misused. Although my proposed paradigm does not guarantee recognition 
of specific rights of individual choice and action respecting any or all 
moral issues,l08 recognition of mythic stature for women as decision-
105. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 7. 
106. Cornell, supra note 19, at 194-95, illustrates this point in her discussion of 
Morrison's Beloved as a retelling of the Medea myth. The context of slavery is criti-
cal to the story, but Morrison's reliance on a myth familiar to all readers is essential 
to the force of the contextual story. 
107. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. I also doubt that such a Justice 
would rely on unproven assumptions as a substitute for proven context, as many 
Justices evidently did in the parental-notification abortion decisions. See Pine, supra 
note 8. 
108. The narrative of myth may, however, have an impact on how we describe 
rights that are rooted in an archetypal dimension. For example, a right labeled a right 
of privacy does not, for me, adequately represent a right applicable to women facing 
an abortion decision. Rhetoric conventionally explicates the right of privacy as a right 
of autonomy, a right to self-definition, a right to psychological self-determination, a 
right to individuality, a right to be economically and politically self-sufficient, or a 
right to be free from the pain associated with childbirth. This rhetoric fails to convey 
the dimension of myth necessary either to affirm a woman's archetypal stature or to 
promote appropriate constitutional problem-solving. It emphasizes isolation (and, occa-
sionally, alleged differences between women confronting an abortion decision and oth-
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makers and actors is a prerequisite to an adequate discussion of constitu-
tional (or any other) rights for women. A narrative of myth enhances 
contextual stories of women's lives but does not consign women to a 
limited existence as a purely contextual beings. A narrative of myth com-
pletes the feminist paradigm by affirming women's legitimate place with-
in the rich, perilous, and aspirational realm of individual rights and re-
sp<mSibility withol11 denying wotp.enthe reality of their con~xt. 
er people) rather than tensions between autonomous choice and communal responsi-
bility (which are implicit in many decisions, not simply an abortion decision). 
